How Do Economic Incentives Affect Social Preferences and Behavior Essay Example for Free

How Do Economic Incentives Affect Social Preferences and Behavior Essay For decades economic theories have relied heavily on the effectiveness of material incentives (Fehr Gachter, 2001). According to the traditional exchange theory all people are exclusively motivated by their own material self-interest. It predicts that the introduction of a penalty will reduce the occurrence of the behavior that is subject to the fine. On the other hand it states that introducing a material incentive will lead to an increase of the behavior related to the bonus. Based on economic theory, incentives have become increasingly popular and are used to increase certain behaviors in various fields including environmental policy (Andersen Sprenger, 2000; Barde Smith, 1997; Baumol Oates, 1988; Kahn, 1995; all cited in ThOgersen, 2003), household surveys (Singer, 2002) and education policy (Fryer, 2011). On the other side, penalties have been used to reduce free-riding (Feldman, Papadimitriou, Chuang, Stoica, 2006), and crimes (Akerlof Dickens, 1982). There is much evidence that supports the basic premise of economics that incentives are effective (Gibbons, 1997; Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; all cited in Benabou Tirole, 2004). However, a large body of literature in psychology has shown that explicit incentives lead to decreased motivation and reduced performance in the long run (Deci Ryan, 1985; as cited in Benabou Tirole, 2004). Titmuss (1970, as cited in Benabou Tirole, 2004) was the first who claimed that people might adopt a ‘market mentality’ when they are exposed to explicit economic incentives. He found that paying blood donors for donating blood could actually reduce supply. In the beginning there was little hard evidence that social preferences affected individual behavior, but empirical and theoretical advances over the past decades provide the basis for more support. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) found that introducing a monetary fine for late-coming parents in day-care centers led to a significant increase in late-coming. There was no reduction in late-coming after the fine was removed. Also Fryer (2011) didn’t find evidence that providing financial incentives to teachers to increase student performance had any effect. Partly because of these findings, terms as trust, reciprocity, gift exchange and fairness have appeared in the empirical study and modeling of principal-agent relationships (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). This highlights the importance of the influence that social preferences have on incentives. Based on the contradictions mentioned above I conclude that a more thorough analysis is needed in order to understand the influence of incentives on behavior. I’ll focus on the interplay between incentives and social preferences and how this affects behavior. In this paper I will review several mechanisms that can explain how incentives can be less effective than economic theories predict and how they can even have counterproductive effects. Furthermore I will indicate the implications of the (non-)effectiveness of incentives for economic policy. Overview of past research According to the definition of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012), social preferences refer to â€Å"motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic pleasure in helping others, inequity aversion, ethical commitments and other motives that induce people to help others more than would an own-material-payoff maximizing individual† (p. 4). Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) have indicated the most important types of preferences that have been uncovered by the literature. I will shortly review them below. The first important type of social preference is the preference for reciprocal fairness or reciprocity. An individual is reciprocal when he responds kindly to actions that are perceived as kind, and when he responds hostile to actions that are perceived as hostile. Whether some action is perceived as hostile of kind depends on the unfairness or fairness of the intention and on the consequences that are associated with the action. A second social preference type is inequity aversion. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999; as cited in Fehr Fischbacher, 2002) â€Å"inequity averse persons want to achieve an equitable distribution of material resources† (p. C3). Inequity averse persons show altruistic behavior if the other persons’ payoffs are below an equitable level. However, if the other persons’ payoffs are exceeding the equitable level an inequity averse person want to decrease the other persons’ payoffs. There are a lot of similarities in the behavior of reciprocal and inequity averse individuals, since both concepts depend in some way on the perception of fairness. Pure altruism is the third type of social preference, which is very different from the former two. Altruism can be seen as an unconditional form of kindness (Fehr Fischbacher, 2002), as an altruistic person would never take an action that decreases another person’s payoff. The problem with pure altruism is that it cannot explain conditional cooperation, that is, people want to increase their voluntary cooperation in response to cooperation of others. The last social preference type that Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) mentioned is envious or spiteful preferences. An envious or spiteful person always values the payoff of other agents negatively. Therefore the envious person is willing to decrease the other agent’s payoff even if it brings along a personal cost to himself. This happens irrespective of fair or unfair behavior of the other agent and irrespective of the pay-off distribution (Fehr Fischbacher, 2002). However, spitefulness can’t explain why it is that the same individuals sometimes are willing to help others at a personal cost, while sometimes they harm other people. Over the past decades, many studies have confirmed that a significant fraction of individuals engage in reciprocal or altruistic behaviors (Buraschi Cornelli, 2002; as cited in Benabou Tirole, 2004; Fehr Gachter, 2000). Thus, many individuals do not only care about the material resources allocated to them, but also care about material resources allocated to other relevant agents. To give an overview of the incentive effects on preferences, two distinctions are made: the nature and the causes of incentives (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). Concerning the nature of incentives, people often respond to the mere presence of incentives, rather than to their extent (Gneezy, 2003; as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). However, the extent of an incentive may also play a role. Therefore the effects of incentives on social preferences can be either categorical or marginal or a combination of the two. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) also make a distinction between 2 causes of incentive effects on preferences. First, incentives can affect the environment in which preferences are learned. When this happens, the preferences are referred to as endogenous preferences. Second, the extent or presence of incentives affect the behavioral salience of an individual’s social preferences. When incentives constitute different states, we refer to social preferences as state-dependent preferences. There are three mechanisms that make social preferences state-dependent. First, by implementing an incentive, the principal discloses information about his intentions, about his beliefs about the target of the incentives and about the targeted behavior. This information might affect the agent’s social preferences which in turn affect the agent’s behavior. Second, incentives provide situational cues for appropriate behavior. Finally, incentives may lead to a crowding out of intrinsic motivations. The crowding-out effect is based on the intuition that the presence of punishments or rewards spoils the reputational value of good deeds. This creates doubt within the individual about the extent to which he performed because of the incentives rather than for himself. This phenomenon is also referred to as the ‘overjustification effect’ (Lepper, Greene, Nisbett, 1973; as cited in Benabou Tirole, 2004). In the next part of this paper I’ll give experimental evidence for both endogenous preferences and for all 3 mechanisms that make preferences incentive-state-dependent. Furthermore, I’ll give examples of experiments where crowding in has been found and explain the underlying mechanisms. 1. Endogenous preferences: incentives alter how new preferences are learned Preferences are endogenous if someone’s experiences lead to durable changes in motivations and eventually result in a change in behavior in certain situations (Bowles, 2008). In most cases, experiments have a few hours duration and therefore it’s unlikely to uncover the mechanisms that are involved in the process of durable change of preferences. Although it’s hard to explore the causal mechanisms at work, there exist some experiments that do show a durable learning effect (Irlenbausch Sliwka, 2005; Falkinger, Fehr, Gachter, Winter-Ebmer, 2000; all cited in Bowles, 2008). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), for example, examined if the introduction of a monetary fine for late-coming parents in day-care centers would lead to reduction of late-coming. However, the amount of late-coming parents didn’t decrease, but increased significantly. Thus incentives led to more self-interested behavior. More importantly, after the fine was removed no reduction in late-coming parents was shown, meaning that there was some durable learning effect going on. 2. State-dependent preferences: incentives provide information about the principal When an incentive is imposed on an agent, he may infer information about the principal who designed the incentive. He may, for example, infer information about the principal’s beliefs regarding the agent, and about the nature of the task that has to be done (Fehr Rockenbach, 2003). This information can lead to a negative response to fines that are imposed by principals. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) designed a sequentially played social dilemma experiment and examined how sanctions intended to prevent cheating affect human altruism. Participants in the role of ‘investor’ could transfer a certain amount of money to another player, the ‘trustee’. The experimenter tripled this amount. After tripling the money, the trustee was given the opportunity to back-transfer some of this money to the investor. The investor could indicate a desired level of the back-transfer before he transferred the money to the trustee. In the incentive-condition the investor even had the option to impose a fine if the trustee would send a back-transfer that was less than the desired amount. Instead of imposing a fine the investor could also choose to decline the use of the fine. The decision of imposing or declining the fine was known to the trustee. In the trust-condition the investor could not make use of incentives. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) found that generous initial transfers by investors were reciprocated with greater back-transfers by trustees. However, the use of the fine reduced the return transfers, while renouncing the fine in the incentive-condition increased back-transfers. This means that sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely (Fehr Rockenbach, 2003). In another experiment by Fehr and Schmidt (2007), principals could choose between offering a bonus contract or a combination contract (which was a combination of the bonus contract with a fine) to the employee. What they found was that agents perceive that principals who are less fair are more likely to choose a combined contract and are less likely to pay the announced bonus. Furthermore the effect of effort on the bonus paid is twice as large in the pure bonus condition compared to the combined contract condition. The positive response to the principal’s renunciation of the fine option can be seen as a categorical effect. The threat of a fine led to diminishment of the trustee’s reciprocity. 3. State-dependent preferences: incentives may suggest permissible behavior The experiments that will be described here, differ from the experiments mentioned above in the way that here incentives are implemented exogenously by the experimenter. This means that incentives do not provide any information about the beliefs or intentions of other experimental subjects. In a lot of situations people look for clues of appropriate behavior. These are often provided by incentives. These framing effects have been investigated in many studies. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994; as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that by making a game sound more competitive after relabeling it, generosity and fair-minded behavior in the participants were diminished. In some other studies (Ellingsen, Johannesson, Munkhammar, Mollerstrom, 2008; as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012) the framing effect even appeared to have changed subjects’ beliefs about the actions of others. Framing effects can also be induced in other ways than simply renaming the experiment. Providing an incentive may already provide a powerful frame for the decision maker. In an experiment of Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) subjects played an Ultimatum Game experiment in which player 1 is given an endowment and asked to propose a part of this endowment to player 2. Player 2 can either accept or reject this division. If he accepts, the proposed division is implemented. However, if he rejects both players receive nothing. Schotter et al (1996) found that if a market-like competition was included in the game, that is, subjects with lower earnings would be excluded from the second round in the game, player 1 proposed less generous divisions to player 2. Furthermore, lower offers were accepted by player 2. The authors interpreted these results as that implementing market-like competition â€Å"offers justifications for actions that in isolation would be unjustifiable† (p. 38). Thus, providing incentives in the form of a competition can lead to moral disengagement. The framing effects of incentives can occur in cases of government-imposed incentives as well. An example comes from an experiment from Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis (2000) where they studied the effects of external regulatory control of environmental quality. Participants were asked to choose how much time they would spend collecting firewood from a forest, while being aware that this activity has a negative effect on local water quality. Two treatments were considered to examine whether external control may crowd out group-oriented behavior. All subjects played eight initial rounds of the game without any treatment, that is, without being able to communicate with each other and without external regulation. After the initial rounds, one subset of groups played additional rounds in which they were able to communicate. The other subset of groups was confronted with a government-imposed regulation. The regulation also involved the possibility of imposing a fine to subjects that would withdraw too much of the firewood. Although standard economic theory predicted that the regulation would increase group-oriented behavior, this wasn’t the case. When subjects were able to communicate they made way more efficient decisions. However, regulatory external control caused subjects to make decisions that were closer to their self-interest. This means that the fine, although it was insufficient to enforce the social optimum, extinguished the subjects’ ethical aptitudes. 4. State-dependent preferences: incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination A third reason why social preferences may be state dependent is because providing incentives may lead to motivational crowding out. As Bowles (2008) put it: â€Å"where people derive pleasure from an action per se in the absence of other rewards, the introduction of explicit incentives may ‘overjustify’ the activity and reduce the individual’s sense of autonomy† (p. 607). According to Deci (1975; as cited in Bowles, 2008) the underlying psychological mechanism appears to be a desire for â€Å"feelings of competence and self-determination that are associated with intrinsically motivated behavior† (p. 1607). There is a large body of literature on the psychology of intrinsic motivations going back to the early work of Festinger (1957; as cited in ThOgersen, 2003) and his cognitive dissonance theory. In the past decades a lot of experiments have been done to test the crowding out of intrinsic motivation. One of these studies comes from Gneezy Rustichini (2000b) who tested the effects of monetary incentives on student performance. 180 students were asked to answer 50 questions of an IQ test. They were all paid 60 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) for their participation in the experiment. The students were divided into 4 different groups, which were all corresponding to 4 different treatments. The students in the first treatment group were only asked to answer as many questions as possible. The students in the second group got an extra payment of 10 cents of a NIS per question that they answered correctly. Subjects in the third group were promised 1 NIS, and subjects in the fourth group 3 NIS per question that they answered correctly. The average number of questions correctly was approximately 28 in the first group and declined to 23 in the second group. Furthermore, the number increased to 34 in both the third and the fourth group. The differences in performance were significant. In a second experiment Gneezy Rustichini (2000b) tested the effect of incentives on volunteer work performed by high school children. 180 children were divided into three groups. The subjects in the first group constituted the control group and they were only given a speech about the importance of volunteer work. The second group was given a speech as well, but was also promised to receive 1 per cent of the total amount of donations collected. The third group was promised 10 per cent of the amount collected. The average amount collected was highest in the first group and lowest in the second group. The average amount that was collected by the third group was higher than that of the second group but not as high of the amount that was collected in the first group. Also these results were significant. It appears to indicate that the effect of incentives can be detrimental, at least for small amounts. In another experiment, Falk and Kosfeld (2006; as cited in Bowles 2008) tested the idea that control aversion based on the self-determination motive is the reason that incentives reduce performance. They used a principal-agent game where agents could choose a level of production that was beneficial for the principal, but costly for themselves. If the agent chose to produce nothing, he would get a maximal pay-off. Before the agent’s decision the principal could decide to leave the choice f production level completely to the agent or to impose a certain lower bound on the agent’s production level. The experimenter varied the bounds across the treatments and the principal could only choose to impose it or not. Results showed that when the principal imposed the bound, the agents chose a lower production level than when the principal didn’t impose a bound. The ‘untrusting’ principals earned half of the profits of those who did trust the agents and thus didn’t impose a bound. In post-surveys, the agents indicated that imposing the lower bound was perceived as a signal of distrust. The results of this experiment suggest that the desire for self-determination and control aversion are not the only effects of imposing the bound. Imposing this minimum was informative for the agents about what the principals’ beliefs were regarding the agents: the principals who imposed the bounds had lower expectations of the agents. Thus, the results in the experiment of Falk and Kosfeld (2006; as cited in Bowles 2008) seem to be the result of both negative information about the principal (or incentive designer) as well as the result of self-determination. 5. Crowding in Although a lot of experiments show that providing incentives has a negative effect on social preferences, there is also some evidence that crowding in can occur, that is, social preferences and incentives enhance the effect on each other. This might happen when an incentive provides good news about the principal’s type or intentions, for example when he offers the agent a reward rather than a fine. It is also seen in experiments where the incentive designers are peers in a public goods game who pay to punish free riders in order to sustain cooperative behavior (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). The phenomenon of crowding in is interesting since it indicates how policies could be implemented optimally and how incentives and social preferences could become complements rather than substitutes (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). Besides that, it appears that crowding in happens often in Public Goods games and Common Pool Resources games, which display the same characteristics as public policy settings. Below I’ll give an example of an experiment in which crowding in was found. Fehr and Gachter (2000) conducted a public good experiment with and without the opportunity to punish. In the no-punishment treatment the dominant strategy is complete free-riding. In the punishment treatment free-riders could be punished by their altruistic peers, since it was costly for them to punish. Therefore, if there were only selfish individuals, as assumed in economic theory, there wouldn’t be a difference between the two treatments. However, in the no-punishment treatment the contributions of the players were substantially lower than in the punishment treatment. This suggests that powerful motives drive the punishments of free-riders. Furthermore there was evidence that the more free-riders deviated from cooperation, the more they were being punished. There are several mechanisms that can explain the effect of crowding in. In the first place when a peer imposes a fine on a free-rider, this may activate a feeling of shame. Barr (2001; as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that just a verbal message of disapproval already can have a positive effect on the free riders’ contributions. A second mechanism that appears to be at work it that nobody wants to be the cooperator while all others are defecting. Shinada and Yamagishi (2007, as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that students cooperated more in a public goods experiment when they were assured that defecting free-riders would be punished. They just didn’t want to be exploited by defectors. A third mechanism underlying crowding in was consistent with the findings of an experiment by Vertova and Galbiati (2010, as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). They found that when a stated obligation was introduced, this produced a larger effect when it was accompanied with a small monetary incentive, rather than with a big incentive or than when no incentives were offered. The authors interpreted this phenomenon as that the salience of the stated obligation is enhanced by large explicit incentives. The latter phenomenon was also found in Ireland, where a small tax was imposed on plastic grocery bags (Rosenthal, 2008; as cited in Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). After two weeks there was a 94% decline in the use of these bags. This result can be explained by the fact that the introduction of the tax was preceded by a large publicity campaign. Thus, the incentive was implemented jointly with a message of social obligation and it seems that it served as a reminder of the importance of one’s civic duty. Implications for policy Many policies are based on the self-interest hypothesis that predicts that all individuals are self-regarding. However, as we have seen social preferences play an important role as well when it comes down to behavior. This would mean that a lot of current policies are non-optimal. Therefore a big challenge is facing the mechanism designer: how to design optimal fines, taxes or subsidies when the individual’s responses depend on his preferences which in turn are determined by the incentive imposed? In most experiments the effects of incentives were studies and afterwards the mechanisms were identified that could explain the results. However, one of the problems that the designer is facing is that he must determine beforehand how incentives will affect behavior. Based on the experiments that have been done, several guidelines can be drawn. The first is that when crowding out is found, social preferences and incentives are substitutes. This means that a negative effect of incentives is less likely to be found when the social preferences are minimal. In contrast, when social preferences are prevalent among a society, it may be more convenient to reduce the use of incentives. Also, policies that are implemented in order to enhance social preferences will be more effective when incentives are little used. The second stems from Titmuss’s claim that if the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive has an opposite effect than intended, incentives should be used less. However, in many cases the effectiveness of incentives is not reversed, but blunted and then the implications for the optimal use of incentive isn’t that obvious (Bowles Hwang, 2008). How Bowles Hwang (2008) state it: â€Å"the reduced effectiveness of the incentive associated with crowding out would entail a larger incentive for a planner designing a subsidy to ensure compliance with a quantitative target† (p. 4). Present evidence is insufficient in providing enough guidelines to the policy maker who wants to know ex ante what the effects are of the incentives that he considers to implement (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). What we do know is that the same incentives imposed by individuals who have no personal benefit but only want to promote pro-social behavior (as in the experiment of Fehr Gachter, 2000) are more likely to increase contributions than when imposed by an untrusting principal (Fehr Rockenbach, 2003). Furthermore it seems to be important to let the agent understand that the desired change in behavior would be socially beneficial rather than that the incentive is perceived as a threat to her autonomy or reflecting badly on the designer’s intentions (Bowles Polania-Reyes, 2012). Conclusion The self-interest hypothesis assumes that individuals are only motivated by their own material self-interest. This assumption is used in the design of many policies. However, in the past decades a lot of experiments have shown that other-regarding social preferences rather than self-regarding preferences play a role in behavior. We have seen that some mechanisms can induce pro-socially oriented individuals to behave as they are selfish. On the other hand, there are also examples of experiments in which mechanisms induce self-interested individuals to behave at a more pro-social level. Thus, incentives can lead to both crowding out and crowding in phenomena. Whereas negative information about the principal and the over-justification effect may lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivation to contribute to a good, altruistic punishment by peers who do not benefit personally is more likely to increase contributions. Furthermore it seems important to make individuals aware of their civic duty, as was shown in Ireland where a small tax was imposed on plastic bags. Regarding to public policy, we have seen that small differences in institutional design can lead to many different outcomes. This imposes a big challenge on the policy designer who has to know ex ante what the effects of the incentive that he is considering to implement will be. When social preferences are not present, incentives may have a positive effect, predicted by economic theory. However, in areas where social preferences do play a role, the use of monetary incentives needs to be reconsidered.

Media Violence - Cartoon Violence and Violent Children :: Argumentative Persuasive Topics

Cartoon Violence and Violent Children With the recent increase in violent crimes committed by children, adults have been looking for answers to what causes children to commit these acts. Researchers have performed formal studies, and other approaches have been taken to answer the question. Their ideas and perceptions have strayed far and wide, looking for a suitable answer; one such answer of the many they have uncovered is television, but especially television geared towards children: cartoons and animation. In recent years, animation has taken a more openly violent twist during the same time period that the unique and varied forms of Japanese animation have come to America; both have raised many parents' eyebrows as articles and media coverage portray both, but especially Japanese animation, in a harsh and unfair light, depicting all series and movies as violent and only fit for mature audiences. The adults' perception of animation varies greatly from the children's perception, as many factors, such as media depictions , personal opinions, and even the standards of cultures, come into play on the decision of what is suitable for younger viewers. While it is not the first medium ever to reproduce violence for entertainment, television has certainly been the most notorious. However, television stations "do not air violence because they want to. They air it because that is what sells. The blame is upon ourselves for the large volume of violence, since they are merely responding to what we want" (Kim). This love for violence has filtered into nearly every television show aired currently. Virtually every television station airs shows, either live action or animated, that involve the characters fighting, arguing, or just acting in a malevolent way towards something or somebody else. The news always carries stories of what crimes have been committed during the day, daytime talk shows and soap operas often involve fighting and conflict, and even children's television is starting to take a more serious, mature twist in its presentations. Shows such as the live action series Mighty Morphin' Power Rangers have been called into que stion because of the numerous fight scenes and injuries that they depict; however, Power Rangers is one show that does provide a message to children at the end, informing them that the fighting is not real and that they should not imitate the Power Rangers. Despite this warning, children do imitate their heroes, hoping to emulate them and be able to stand as strong and powerful as they do.

Causes And Effects Of Air Pollution

When air gets polluted with dust, smoke, motor vehicles, mills and factories etc. is called air pollution. We know that air is an important element of our environment. But it is a matter of great regret that it is being polluted day by day in different reasons. Causes of Air pollution:There are different kinds of reasons of air pollution. The causes of air pollution are described below.1. Using poison in agriculture: In agricultural sectors, farmers often use insecticides, pesticides and fertilizers etc. These get mixed with air and causes air pollution. Besides, Ammonia is a very common by product from agriculture related activities and is one of the most hazardous gases in the atmosphere. âž ¢ Air Pollution-Paragraph2. Burning of Fossil Fuels: Burning of fossil fuels like coal, petroleum and other factory combustibles is one the major causes of air pollution. Smoke emitting from vehicles like buses, trucks, jeeps, cars, trains, airplanes etc. causes air pollution.3. Industrial sm oke: In mills and factories, large amount of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, organic compounds, and chemicals is emitted that causes air pollution. It is true that mills and factories can be found at every corner of the world that cause a huge amount of harmful gases that are the major causes of air pollution.4. Indoor activities: Different kinds of household activities like cleaning products, washing, painting etc. emit different kinds of toxic chemicals in the air and cause air pollution.Effects of Air pollution: There are different kinds of negative and harmful effects of air pollution. The effects of air pollution are described below.1. Global warming: Air pollution causes global warming in a great scale. With  increased temperatures world wide, increase in sea levels and melting of ice from colder regions and icebergs, displacement and loss of habitat have already signaled an impending disaster if actions for preservation and normalization aren't undertaken soon.2. Causes dise ases: The effects of Air pollution are very harmful for health. It causes different kinds of respiratory diseases like heart attack, Cancer, bronchitis etc. Every year millions of people of all over the world die due to direct or indirect effects of air pollution.3. Acid Rain:Acid raining is another effects of air pollution. Harmful gases like nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides are released into the atmosphere during the burning of fossil fuels. When it rains, the water droplets combines with these air pollutants, becomes acidic and then falls on the ground in the form of acid rain. Acid rain can cause great damage to human, animals and crops.4. Depletion of Ozone layer:Air pollution depletes Ozone layer. Ozone exists in earth’s stratosphere and is responsible for protecting humans from harmful ultraviolet (UV) rays. Earth’s ozone layer is depleting due to the presence of chlorofluorocarbons, hydro chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere. As ozone layer will go thin, it w ill emit harmful rays back on earth and can cause skin and eye related problems. UV rays also have the capability to affect crops.5. Harms to the wild life:Air pollution harms the wilderness. Humans and animals face a lot of devastating effects due to air pollution. Toxic chemicals present in the air can force wildlife species to move to new place and change their habitat. The toxic pollutants deposit over the surface of the water and can also affect sea animals.6. Depletion of Ozone layer:Air pollution depletes Ozone layer. Ozone exists in earth’s stratosphere and is responsible for protecting humans from harmful ultraviolet (UV) rays.  Earth’s ozone layer is depleting due to the presence of chlorofluorocarbons, hydro chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere. As ozone layer will go thin, it will emit harmful rays back on earth and can cause skin and eye related problems. UV rays also have the capability to affect crops.Conclusion:In the long run, it can be said that it is the right time to protect air pollution. To create a better place to live in for the human being and wilderness we have stop air pollution.

Essay on General Electric Training Effectiveness - 1097 Words

The Leadership Development GE-Style case study offers a glimpse in to the management and leadership training provided by General Electric to its seasoned executives (Kreitner, 2008). The history of General Electric dates back to the days of Thomas Edison, with the formal company forming in 1892 (GE, 2010). General Electric is a successful company, which spans a history of over a century of time. They have grown from a company primarily concerned with electricity to one that competes globally in diversified markets such as finance, television production, aircraft engines, medical imaging, and power generation (GE, 2010). In addition, they employ roughly 300,000 people in over 100 countries (GE, 2010). Accomplishing such success†¦show more content†¦The company provides a training venue with its people in mind, where status is secondary to learning. GE obviously grooms their people to meet their own internal expectations and provides real GE problems to solve. Magnifyin g this point further is that only one-third of all lecturers come from external sources (Kreitner, 2008). In addition, after each course, the teams are required to report their findings back to the company CEO (Kreitner, 2008). Taking all of this into consideration, I think GE provides its executives with a good mix of management theory, research, and hands on experience to make the manager training programs successful internally for General Electric. Conversely, can GE’s manager-training courses span to external applications? The jury may still be out regarding this question. Embedded very deeply in their training programs is GE’s corporate philosophy and culture that applying the skills learned at Crotonville to other environments may be difficult. In a 2005 Fortune magazine article, the magazine found an even split down the middle when it compared the performance of thirty-four previous GE executives now occupying executive positions of other large corporations against the SP 500 (Kratz, 2005). Half of the previous GE managers out preformed the SP 500 while half faltered. Those who faltered had a difficult time understanding the culture of their new companies. GE’s human resources chief, Bill Conaty, put itShow MoreRelatedThe Effects of Cultural Intelligence on Leadership Effectiveness in Multinational Organizations1354 Words   |  5 PagesA Study on Cultural intelligence and its effect on leadership effectiveness and behavior in multinational organizations in Asia Introduction The success of corporate sector is the critical element for the sustained growth and prosperous economy of any nation. 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Apart from the four-day training/learning program, consisting of three separate modules (e.g., leader role in change, skills for implementing change, motivational and empowerment practices), the consultants used (e.g., two professors from leading business schools, experts in leadership) initiated the training by rendering each participant (e.g., employees) a surveyed feedback from their own workplace colleagues. InRead MoreThe Importance Of Training For A Job1697 Words   |  7 Pageson the right job results in the best outcome. Training and Development: The two terms are very identical to each other, but they are not the identical in meaning. Training is a learning process that targets to permanently improve the ability and behavior of the employees by allowing them to acquire new skills, knowledge and attitude for more proficient performance. This includes: †¢ identification of training necessities †¢ Framing suitable training programs †¢ providing essential job skills and knowledgeRead MoreIntroduction Of Finolex Cables Limited1574 Words   |  7 PagesDepartment in mid 1950’s for wire harnesses for trucks and tanks. Starting from a small industrial unit in 1956, they at first manufactured PVC insulated cables for the automobile industry. Finolex brand was born from Fine Flexibles and O with an electric arc across it - signifying the electrical cable business the company was in. The company saw its own share of difficult times however with its persistent efforts and never give up attitude, the company in 1972 turned into a limited company. In JulyRead MoreEffectiveness Of Integrating First Aid Education Essay1507 Words   |  7 PagesTitle: Effectiveness of integrating first-aid education in school curricula at Wenzhou-Kean University. Description: The timely first-aid provided by bystanders is critical to minimize deaths or permanent injuries resulting from accidents. Although the first-aid training programs have been systemically integrated into undergraduate curricula in most advanced countries, little recognition for first-aid education is currently given in most non-medical universities in China. Therefore, the aims of thisRead MoreShould Animals Be A Food Reward And The Second Being An Affectionate Reward1663 Words   |  7 Pagesseparate kinds of training. The first type being a food reward and the second being an affectionate reward. Our paper is based on a study conducted at Butler University by students in the Department of Psychology. This study was performed on 270 cats and dogs, but for this particular situation we cut the sample size to 119 cats and dogs. These cases were randomly selected to keep the data as accurate as possible. The additional articles that were examined looked at each type of training addressed in